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I. ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
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PACE Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
SAR zone Search and Rescue zone 
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute  
SOLAS International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
UNHCR  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this research is to analyse and test EU border policy instruments designed to 
ensure refugee protection. While scholars have discussed the securitization of EU border 
policies and the negative consequences of this for the protection of refugees, a systematic 
examination of the instruments designed to ensure refugee protection is still missing. I posit 
that the EU’s border policy instruments reflect a near-sighted attitude. Analyzing the 
instruments aimed at ensuring refugee protection, not only provides an insight into the 
weaknesses and strengths of each policy instrument, it will also show legislative gaps which 
allow EU member states to act in accordance with their national interest rather than EU border 
policy. Using data from policy papers, evaluation reports, and newspapers I outline the 
objectives and legal foundations of the instruments. I will then apply them to the case of the 
Arab Spring to test whether these instruments have lived up to their foundational objectives. 
The results suggest that the instruments of EU border policy were too weak to protect 
refugees. 
Key words: Refugee protection, EU border policy, Arab Spring 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the first protest broke out in Tunisia in December 2010, a crescendo of transnational 
uprisings in the Arab world
1
 captured the world’s attention. These uprisings, which became 
referred to as the Arab Spring, became increasingly more violent and due to either the fear of 
prosecution and violence or simply the hope of finding an economically brighter future, 
people started fleeing from the Arab world to Europe (Al Jazeera 2011a). A year later the 
reaction of the European Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malmström - regarding the 
performance of the European Union (EU) member states dealing with the consequences of 
these developments - proclaimed that: 
 
‘particularly when it comes to dealing with the men, women, and children 
coming to Europe for protection or in search of a better life, European leaders 
have not been as supportive’ (Cecilia Malmström, 2011a) 
 
Several non-governmental organizations (NGOs) however, have emphasised that this 
statement, albeit a step in the right direction, is too mild. They stated that reception conditions 
were far below standard (HRW 2011:29) and that never before such a high number of 
migrants
2
 had died in their attempt to reach European territory (UNHCR 2012). In contrast to 
Malmström, they state that not only the member states are to blame, but the EU as a whole 
because it has not provided the protection and assistance to refugees as stipulated in European 
law. They conclude that member states and the EU as a whole fell short in protecting 
refugees
3
.  
 
A well grounded assessment of causes explaining the failure has to date not been provided. 
Hitherto, one guiding explanation exists. Member states argued that the unfortunate and 
exceptional character of the Arab Spring induced an extraordinarily high number of migrants 
                                                             
1
 No  universally accepted  definition  of  ‘the Arab world’ exists. However throughout this paper it will include  
the  22  countries  belonging to  the  Arab League (Seib 2005:605). 
2
 Throughout this paper the term migrant will be used as an umbrella for both labor migrants and refugees 
(Klepp 2010:3). 
3
 Throughout the paper the term ‘refugee’ shall apply to ‘any person who owing to well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, 
is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual 
residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it’. (1951 Refugee 
Convention) (UNHCR 1951) 
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for which EU member states were not prepared. However, in the 1990s Schengen States 
managed to cope with hundreds of thousands of refugees and immigrants (Parkes 2011a). 
Looking at more recent data a more manageable 54,000 people reached Italy, Malta and 
Greece in 2008. Over the next two years, border control measures were sharpened by the EU, 
reducing the numbers of migrants significantly. The number of migrants resulting from the 
Arab Spring was 58,000 (Frontex 2012). To conclude, this 7.5 percent increase compared to 
2008 cannot be called an exception and so the existing explanation is false.  
 
If the number of migrants is not able to explain the inability of the EU to protect migrants, 
why were member states falling short? Evidently there should have been enough mechanisms 
to effectively regulate flows of migrants. The acquis communautaire of the EU has always 
been subject to international law, including the obligation to help people fleeing persecution, 
wars and torture. That is why a considerable amount of effort has been put into an equal 
treatment for people who apply for asylum in the EU (Bomberg at al. 2008:138-158). Thus, in 
spite of the instruments created to protect refugees in Europe, member states have failed to 
protect refugees coming to the EU as a result of the Arab Spring. 
 
Suggestions in literature on possible explanations for the inability of the EU to protect 
refugees, draw on the fact that prior to the Arab Spring an increase in border security was not 
accompanied by adequate mechanisms to protect refugees. Nonetheless, to date, no complete 
analysis has been provided in literature as to why the member states fell short in their 
obligations to protect refugees. This begs the question whether a near-sighted attitude adopted 
by the EU when improving border security, simultaneously and unwillingly led to 
mechanisms complicating and diminishing the protection of refugees. The research question 
guiding this study therefore is: to what extent has a near-sighted European border policy, led 
to an inability of the EU to protect refugees? I use the word ‘near-sighted’ to designate an 
attitude of the EU and the member states  focused on border security, with - as a consequence 
- little attention for other aspects of border policy, such as the protection of refugees.   
 
In order to comprehend the impact of the EU’s mechanism to protect refugees completely, it 
is also important to research the most recent influx of migrants testing the border policy of the 
EU. The Arab Spring will serve as an illustration, highlighting the weaknesses of the EU 
mechanisms that were supposed to provide protection to refugees.  
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The significance of this study is paramount as it contributes not only to the understanding of 
difficulties concerning EU refugee protection, but also the weaknesses and handicaps of a 
multilateral organisation such as the EU. The societal implications of the paper are twofold. 
First of all, this study stresses the importance that the EU continues to give protection and 
prospects of a better future for refugees in need of help and concurrently to uphold the 
commitments to international refugee agreements such as the Geneva Convention (Malström 
2011b). In the second place, not offering protection has wider implications on the construction 
and strength of the EU. It emphasises flaws of internal cooperation between EU member 
states. France for example, has reinstated its border control with Italy out of distrust that the 
border will not be adequately secured. This is contra-efficient to the main idea of 
Europeanization of the people (Parkes 2011a), the reconstruction of borders, stops the free 
movement of people. In many areas of European cooperation, the free travel area is suffering 
from a chronic lack of trust between its members (Nielsen 2012). The full effects of a collapse 
of Schengen Area are untold, but it would likely affect the free movement of goods as well.  
 
The result of this analysis suggests that even prior to the Arab Spring, most of the EU’s 
policies and regulations were considered by EU member states and NGOs as incapable of 
protecting refugees. This was due to weak legal foundations, insufficient instruments and mal- 
implemented instruments. The failing mechanism of the EU gave room to EU member states 
to refrain from their obligations and acts out of national interest.  
 
This research is presented in five chapters. Chapter I presents the literature pertinent to my 
study. The Chapter will elaborate on explanations that have been provided to account for the 
failure of refugee protection by the EU. As such, it will show how the dialogue between 
different scholars has addressed several questions but left others unanswered. This blank in 
literature will be the start of my research. This is followed by Chapter II which stipulates 
some of the theoretical insights and dilemmas that have emerged as a result of refugee 
protection. Then I will come the main part of the research, which analyses and assesses 
refugee protection mechanisms in Europe. Chapter III presents the research and findings 
concerning three instruments of internal European border policy. Chapter IV presents the 
research and findings concerning instruments of external European border policy. 
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1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The issue of refugee protection has been the focus of intense debate in recent years, much of 
which is centred around questions regarding how far and in what ways migrants, including 
refugees, pose a problem or a threat to recipient states. From this debate, another question has 
been cropping up recently, namely, to what extent do refugees still receive the full protection 
of recipient states according to the Geneva Convention? The following review of the literature 
addresses these questions and represents the literature pertinent to my research study, namely, 
securitization
4
 of migration, refugee protection in the EU, and refugee protection in the EU 
during the Arab Spring. 
 
1.1 Securitization of migration and the effect on refugee protection 
The mobilization of people around the globe has increased with growing populations, easier 
and cheaper forms of transport, and new technological advancements (Squire 2009:8). 
Although migrants were once welcomed in territories such as the US and Europe, more 
recently the issue has arguably become securitized (Faist 2004; Huysmans 2006; Guild 2009; 
Vaughan-Williams 2009).  
 
While consensus appears to exist amongst experts concerning the process of securitization, 
there is disagreement regarding the reasons leading to and accelerating this process of 
securitization. Some scholars argue that the process started in the 1980s (Weiner 1995), while 
others argue that migration was securitized in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in 
2001. International migration has served as a fitting reference point for indistinct fears 
(Weiner 1995; Choucri 2002; McNevin 2007) which are related to the threat of international 
crime, terrorism and the dissolution of transitional forms of community (Vaughan-Williams 
2010). Squire (2009) analyses the UK and argues that asylum seekers serve as a scapegoat for 
broad shifts in governance and belonging, often articulated as job insecurity and economic 
uncertainty. This negative mindset of the UK population towards migrants pushed the 
government to limit the number of asylum seekers and complicate the asylum application 
process. 
 
                                                             
4
 The process of turning a policy issue such as migration into a security issue (Faist 2004:332) 
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Guild (2009) emphasized the consequences of this negative mindset. According to her, the 
consequences stemming from the securitization of migration complicated the ways in which 
states live up to their obligation to protect refugees in accordance with the Geneva 
Convention. Guild explains that the failure of the state to protect refugees is a consequence of 
the securitization of migration. In contrast to other scholars she focuses on the individual 
rather than the state’s collective security. Exclusion of migrants is the consequence of the 
state’s maintenance of collective security, which enters into conflict with the individuals 
claim of individual security (Guild 2009, Cohen 2003). Linking this back to border policy and 
refugee protection in the EU: when the EU tries to secure the collective by improving EU 
border security, individuals not belonging to this collective – migrants including refugees – 
enter into conflict with state security.  
 
1.2 Refugee protection and EU border security 
The EU has initiated several mechanisms to regulate its borders and prevent illegal migrants 
from crossing. With the diffusion of borders and the categorizing of migrants, this initiated a 
failure to protect refugees. The following section firstly describes how scholars explain the 
relationship between an increase in border control and the search for new migration routes, 
which led to an externalization of border controls. Secondly, it will describe the consequences 
of fusing refugees and economic migrants. The last section will elaborate on the Arab Spring 
and on the causes for the failure to protect refugees. 
 
The start of an integrated EU border policy dates back to 1985 with the creation of the 
Schengen Agreement.
5
 Among others, it pledged to implement the principle of free movement 
of persons across the Schengen Area. The Schengen Agreement was also incorporated into 
the EU legal framework by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. The agreement abolished all 
internal borders and created a single external border. This external border was in need of 
increased border controls and common policies (EC 2012). Moreover, the securitization of 
migration led to a process of ‘illegitimizing’ the presence of immigrants (Pinyol-Jiménez 
2011). 
 
By securing the de jure border and preventing migrants from entering Europe over land, new 
regulations simultaneously increased smuggling and trafficking networks. Migrants looked 
                                                             
5
 The Schengen Agreement was signed by France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. 
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for new less controlled routes to enter Europe, which are usually longer and more dangerous. 
This stimulated a shift in the EU’s conceptualization of the border, by controlling the border 
at sea and in third countries (William Walters 2002; Guild 2009; Vaughan-Williams 2010). In 
other words, the EU borders were not solely at the de jure border anymore, but border control 
occurred also at sea and in third countries. This is important when studying the EU border 
policy an internal and an external dimension of the border now exists. 
Despite the fact that this change in border security was initially designed to maximise flows of 
legitimate human traffic while filtering out illegitimate movement, scholars point out that 
entering the EU was made more difficult for both parties, especially those of which the 
categorization – economic migrants or refugee was still uncertain. This label for migrants is 
very important as people migrate out of economic or protection seeking reasons. Fusing 
economic migrants and refugees under one umbrella term and requesting them to follow the 
same procedures can therefore be troublesome (Squire 2009). 
 
1.3 Refugee protection during the Arab Spring 
Literature on the EU border policy and refugee protection during the Arab Spring is still 
limited. Nascimbene and Di Pascale (2011) have shed light on the policies of Italy specifically 
during the Arab Spring. They blame infringement of refugee protection on the fact that the 
situation was out of the ordinary and that Italy, when asking for help to the EU did not receive 
it. The solidarity principle was one of the principles to guide migration. It demands EU 
member states to act jointly and to assist one another in face of disasters, emergencies and 
crises within the EU. They question the adequacy of this instrument and the genuine spirit of 
solidarity between the member states (Nascimbene and Di Pascale 2011). Parker partly agrees 
with the questionable effectiveness of the solidarity principle but states it is not certainly a 
situation out of the ordinary (Parkes 2012). He confirms that the Arab Spring indeed 
highlighted the weaknesses of the migration policy. According to Nascimbene and Di Pascale 
(2011), the Arab Spring led to reflection and opened the debate on the migration policy 
instruments available in the EU in a situation of strong pressure on the mechanisms regulating 
migration, affecting one or more member states. The EU-mechanisms were tested by the Arab 
Spring. 
 
There were more EU mechanisms causing an inability to protect refugees during the Arab 
Spring. This paper will outline the strengths and weaknesses of these mechanisms by 
comparing the initial aim of the mechanisms and its feasibility in reality. This has not been 
 12 
researched before and is now possible as a result of the high but not exceptionally high 
number of migrants as a result of the Arab Spring. The following chapter will sketch out the 
main concepts of refugee protection, followed by the hypotheses of my thesis, case selection 
and data selection.  
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2. METHODOLOGY 
 
This research will carry on from the literature provided in the previous chapter. As the 
primary goal is to show the weaknesses and strengths of the mechanisms created to ensure 
refugee protection, this chapter will firstly elaborate on refugee protection and how the 
‘protection’ will be measured. Then, I will explain the concepts of internal and external 
European border policy and the corresponding instruments that should ensure refugee 
protection. Subsequently, I will describe how the strengths and weaknesses of each concept 
will be measured by either the capability-expectations gap or by a case study. This is followed 
by stipulating the hypotheses guiding the research. Finally, I will outline my case selection, its 
relevance and the process of data collection.  
 
2.1 Theory and hypotheses  
2.1.1 REFUGEE PROTECTION 
Refugee protection is the dependent variable (DV) in this analysis. I am aiming to determine 
whether refugees and migrants arriving in the EU received the protection granted under the 
1951 Geneva Convention. Therefore, clear definitions are needed in order to categorize 
individuals. Depending on how an individual is categorized, he or she may acquire different 
normatively charged statuses. The allocation of statuses is the first step in the relationship of 
the foreigner with European security organs. Migration broadly refers to the movement of 
humans across borders whether forced or unforced, whether political or economic. Therefore 
the word ‘migrant’ in this paper refers to the individual enacting this movement. An asylum 
seeker applies only to those migrants who have physically reached the state’s territory or its 
port, and who have submitted the claim for refugee protection. The label refugee will refer to 
‘any person who owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country 
of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of 
his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to return to it’ (1951 Refugee Convention. Under Article 1(A)2). If he or she does 
not meet these criteria, he or she may instead be granted with subsidiary protection, often of a 
temporary nature (Haddad 2008:2-3). ‘Irregular migration’ designates the act of entering a 
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country in breach of migration laws and refers mainly to the act of crossing a border without 
appropriate authorization (Düvell, et al. 2008:3). 
 
The benchmark for refugee protection for this research will consist of two principles: the 
international non-refoulement principle and the European standard. The non-refoulement 
principle, alternatively called the ‘corner stone’ of refugee protection, holds that ‘no 
contracting state shall expel or return  a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of 
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or opinion’ (Goodwin-Gill 1978:117). In 
the view of the UNHCR, the principle of non-refoulement should be applied both within and 
at the border of the territory of a state, ‘irrespective of whether or not [the individuals] have 
been formally recognized as refugees’ (UNHCR 1977). This is important because the 
‘border’, as will be explained later in this Chapter, is not a static concept, rather it is 
constantly evolving and changing. 
 
Upon arrival the benchmark for protection is what in this paper will be referred to as the 
European standard. A fair and efficient asylum procedure identifies individuals in need of 
protection and it separates out those who do not need protection and who can, in principle, be 
safely returned home (UNHCR 1977). For Europe, this entails a Common European Asylum 
System (CEAS), including permanent protection, subsidiary protection and temporary 
protection (Levy 2005:28). In addition member states should have enough capacity in terms 
of reception facilities, asylum seekers should have an equal chance of obtaining protection in 
all EU countries. ‘Common standards of treatment, including legal security, socioeconomic 
benefits and freedom of movement, need to be adopted in order to prevent secondary 
movement of asylum-seekers and refugees’ (UNHCR 2003). It should deal effectively with 
those eliminated from asylum after a fair and satisfactory procedure in line with EU law, in 
order to achieve or preserve the integrity of member states' asylum systems.  
 
An instrument provided by the EU guaranteeing refugee protection will have the aim to live 
up to both principles. Hence refugee protection will be fulfilled when it lives up to the 
following two conditions: 
1. No contracting state shall expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the 
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened  
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2. Member states should be able to provide the needs and protection to nationals of third 
countries in need of permanent protection, subsidiary protection and temporary 
protection (Art 78 TFEU) 
 
2.1.2. INSTRUMENTS PROTECTING REFUGEES 
This brings me to the independent variables (IVs): the instruments of the EU aiming to protect 
refugees.  First I will elaborate on the internal and external border policy instruments aimed to 
ensure refugee protection. Then I will explain how the capability-expectations gap will be 
used to analyse the instruments. Finally I will explain the motivation to use the case of the 
Arab Spring to highlight refugee protection  
 
Internal European border policy 
The internal EU border policy will refer to the policy within Europe and at its de jure border 
and is mainly focused on agreements among EU countries to act in accordance with the 
burden sharing principle and common reception standards. Both should regulate migration 
within the EU and simultaneously ensure the protection of refugees as stipulated above. The 
link between the creation of internal EU border policy and refugee protection is mainly 
underlined by the importance to commonly reach consensus, implement and execute the 
regulations ensuring equal treatment, provide migrants with necessities upon and after their 
arrival in the EU and offer the ability to request asylum. These three objectives of internal EU 
border policy are provided by the burden sharing principle and the reception directive. 
Whether these two instruments are in practice capable to protect refugees is analysed using 
the capability-expectations gap.  
 
Burden sharing principle 
Burden sharing refers to two principles: the solidarity principle and the fair sharing of 
responsibilities. It simply entails the fair distribution of the burdens consequent to EU borders, 
immigration and asylum policy (Thielemann 2006:4). Both underpin the responsibility to any 
collective response to any kind of threat and should be capable of coordinating the migration 
influx into the EU. Therefore it is part of the EU’s internal border policy. The applicability of 
this principle to my research will be explained by the capability-expectations gap. In this 
study it is used as a proxy.  On of the tasks of the burden sharing principle is to share the 
burden of refugees between countries, and if prior to the Arab Spring it was known that this 
principle would not work in practice, than one can state a failure to protect refugees is a result 
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of an unwilling attitude of the EU. The gap between expectations and capability will give an 
insight as to the ability of EU member states to act jointly and also in the dominance of 
individual state interests at the cost of common European interests. The responsibility to 
protect refugees will be left to fewer countries, which will reduce the capacity to protect 
refugees.  
 
Reception of refugees 
Whether or not the burden sharing principle is effective, migrants should always be registered 
and be given temporary protection. The reception standards of the EU are laid down in a 
directive and are an integral part of the protection of refugees in Europe. A well-organized 
registration system ensures the processing of the asylum request and determines whether 
migrants are classified as refugees or as other kind of migrants. In addition, the refugees 
should be offered common standards including legal security, socioeconomic benefits and 
freedom of movement (UNHCR 2003). This is all stipulated in the Reception Directive of 
2003 (EC 2003). If these regulations are not well implemented or are not elaborate enough, 
then a failure of states to protect refugees can be observed in two ways: directly and 
indirectly. Directly, when migrants are not treated in line with the procedures laid down, such 
as imprisoning migrants in detention centers, or non-provision of medical care when needed. 
Indirectly, when refugees might not receive the full application procedure ensuring that they 
be granted protection and a (temporary) residence permit or when refugees or asylum seekers 
decide to leave the country on their own initiative and try to seek asylum elsewhere 
(secondary movement)
6
. The applicability of this principle will be tested by the capability-
expectations gap. 
 
These two policies of the EU become even more interesting as they are all interlinked. When 
burden sharing is not as effective as expected, more pressure will be on the reception of 
refugees. I propose that a near-sighted border policy prior to the Arab Spring caused an 
inability of EU member states to protect refugees during the Arab Spring. This focus on 
securing the border evolved out of the increasing number or regulations and agreements trying 
to fortify the border and restrict criminal activities, terrorist and illegal immigration, as 
described in the literature above. 
                                                             
6
 ‘the phenomenon of refugees, whether they have been formally identified as such or not (asylum-seekers), who 
move on in an irregular manner from countries in which  they have already found protection, in order to seek 
asylum or permanent resettlement elsewhere’ (ExCom 1989: No85 in Bouckaert 2007)  
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For each independent variable – burden sharing and reception – I will look into the actual 
regulations to fulfill these principles and their aims. What have member states agreed upon? 
Then, I will outline whether EU member states were able to live up to the agreements and 
implement the instruments provided. Finally, I will show whether this gap between capability 
and expectations caused an inability to protect refugees of the EU during the Arab Spring. 
The hypothesis that will guide the research of EU internal border policy will therefore be: 
 
Hypothesis I: The bigger the gap between expectations and capabilities of internal EU 
border policy, the less effective EU refugee protection. 
 
External EU border policy 
As delineated in the previous chapter, the EU’s border policy is not solely aimed at the actual 
border. Therefore, a separate framework will be needed to test the expectations and capability 
of EU policies maintained outside the actual border. The phenomenon of the externalization 
of the EU border has been examined by Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild (2005), who theorize 
that border controls do not solely occur at the de jure EU border as marked on a map, but also 
at the Mediterranean Sea and that controls are even conducted in countries which form part of 
the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) (Bigo & Guild 2005:145). Christina Boswell 
(2003) also addresses this shift of border controls, stating that the EU attempts to manage 
migration through cooperation with sending or migration countries. She explains how illegal 
immigration is largely subordinate to the EU strategy of reducing migratory pressures by 
increasing development aid (Boswell 2003: 636). Klepp (2010) builds on this view and states 
that the European policy of firstly intensifying cooperation with transit countries and 
countries of origin of migrants, and secondly strengthening the joint border control missions 
with the border agency Frontex
7
 has not reduced migrant flows attempting to cross the 
Mediterranean. Therefore, the new border regime is counterproductive. Furthermore, because 
Frontex had missions to intercept boats at sea, it remains unclear who is responsible for the 
asylum claim of the potential refugees. This lack of clarity and insufficiency in law has 
allowed forces in the Frontex mission to operate with little regulation and oversight and 
certainly not in line with refugee protection.  
                                                             
7 Frontex is an agency of the EU, set up in 2004, with the responsibility is to coordinate operational cooperation 
between member states, in the forms of joint operation. The ultimate goal is to prevent the arrivals of irregular 
migration (Nambiscnene 2011:351). 
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Third country agreements 
The EU’s external border policy is focused on the agreements between EU countries and third 
countries. The former are mainly centred around stability and aimed at developing countries 
in the North African region as a buffer region for South European borders. Relating this back 
to the ability of the EU to protect refugees, if third country agreements lead to a prevention of 
refugees to request asylum in EU member states, or when third country agreements are made 
with countries that do not recognize the Geneva Convention, then this leads to an 
infringement of the non-refoulement procedure. This paper will use a case study of third 
country agreements between Italy and Libya to illustrate the possible effects of such 
agreements. The choice for these countries is derived from the fact that in the past five years 
this route was the main route for refugees to Europe (Frontex 2012). Moreover, I will show 
that my conclusions do not solely apply to this third country relationship, but to third country 
relationships in general. The guiding hypothesis will therefore be:  
 
Hypothesis II: the more cooperation between third countries and the EU on controlling 
migration, the less effective EU refugee protection. 
 
EU border policy at Sea 
EU border policy also takes place at sea (Bigo and Guild 2005; Klepp 2010). Rather than 
looking into all the instruments for maritime border policy, this research will focus on the 
implementation by member states of EU mechanisms to protect refugees at sea and the EU’s 
main maritime border policy instrument, Frontex. Member states play an important role in the 
implementation and execution of law while Frontex promotes, coordinates and develops 
European border management. In terms of migration it should detect migration routes and 
boats in despair while EU boat patrols are obliged to help the passengers. As it is an EU broad 
principle it will again be analysed by the capability-expectations gap. Relating this back to 
refugee protection during the Arab Spring, this research will stipulate the initial aims and the 
tools given to member states and Frontex
8
 in order to live up to the expectations. If these were 
clear and effective, then it depends on the implementation of the provisions whether refugees 
enjoyed protection at the Mediterranean Sea. However, if this has not been the case, the EU 
                                                             
8 European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders 
of the member states of the European Union (Frontex 2012). 
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has failed to protect refugees. Again this will be highlighted and illustrated by the case of the 
Arab Spring. 
 
Hypothesis III: the more border controls at sea, the less effective EU refugee protection. 
 
2.2 Method of analysis 
The method of analysis used throughout my paper will be based on the capability-
expectations gap. The following section will first describe the theoretical background and then 
will be shown how it fits into this analysis.  
 
Capability-expectations gap 
The capability-expectations gap is a central theory demonstrating weak aspects of European 
foreign policy. The initial idea behind this theory was articulated by Hill (1993). He identified 
the role of the European Community (EC) between what had been discussed and what it was 
actually able to deliver. This gap could be divided into three parts; the ability to agree, the 
availability of instruments and the allocation of resources. The capability-expectations gap 
was not meant to be a static concept, but rather a measure by which EU foreign policy could 
be examined (Hill 1993; Hill 1998; Hill 2004). Criticism was raised arguing that the EU does 
not solely act to fulfill its expectations but also to change the norms in the international 
system. Therefore, the expectation-capability gap is not all inclusive (Manners 1993; Norgues 
2007). However, this criticism does not apply to this study as the EU does not aim to change 
the prevailing norms of the international system with its EU border policy.  
 
As noted, Hill used the capability-expectations gap to understand European foreign policy. 
While acknowledging that this testing method has never been applied to European border 
policy before, this paper will show it is in fact very well suited to do so. The application of 
this theory as a measure for EU border policy can be justified by the threefold division; the 
ability to agree, the availability of instruments and the allocation of resources. Figure 1 
explains the analysis used in three steps. Firstly, the capabilities-expectations gap explains the 
expectations in terms of objectives and legal provision. Secondly, the instrument should be 
entirely implemented in order to be effective. Thirdly, sufficient tools should be provided to 
live up to the expectations. As explained in Figure 1, the moment of testing will be the Arab 
Spring.  
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Figure 1: Analysis through capability-expectations gap 
 
 
The capabilities of the instruments to live up to the expectations are shown when a 
considerable amount of pressure lies on the application of the instrument. Every instrument of 
EU border policy will only be capable to protect refugees if the instrument is strong, 
completely implemented, and has been given enough tools to protect refugees. 
 
Data collection 
For the purpose of my study, I will utilize existing data. For all four IVs I will use EU 
legislation, policy papers and evaluation papers to see whether EU member states were able to 
agree upon the EU border security instruments and the objectives of the instrument. I will use 
evaluation reports of both European institutions – EU, European Commission (EC), European 
Parliament (EP) and the Council of Europe (CoE) - as by NGO’s  - Human Rights Watch 
(HRW), Amnesty International and think tanks – Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI), Clingendeal. The combinations of these different perspectives will provide 
an insight in the implementation before the Arab Spring.  
 
2.3 Case Selection 
 
The motivation to use the case of the Arab Spring as a testing device for EU border policy 
instruments is twofold. Firstly, it is a recent event which best reflects the effectiveness of the 
current EU Border security policies. Secondly, the influx of migrants was not exceptional but 
was still significant enough to illustrate clearly what aspects of EU border policy were 
incapable of protecting refugees. In other words, the Arab Spring highlights weaknesses in 
EU policy which caused an infringement in refugee protection.  
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Case data 
In order to find out whether the EU border policy was prepared for this event I will look into 
newspaper articles from December 2010 until present, retrieved from the newspaper database 
Factiva
9
. Furthermore, I will look into assessments of dependent as well as independent 
parties. Dependent assessments will include review meetings by the Council of Europe and 
the EC, Europol, Frontex and member states. Independent assessments will include research 
carried out by Eurostat, the Institute national d’etudes démographiues (Ined) and NGOs such 
as HRW and Migrants at Sea.  
 
                                                             
9 A joint venture between Dow Jones and Reuters which provides extensive access to global news sources 
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3. INTERNAL BORDER POLICY 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the internal EU border policy instruments designed 
to protect refugees. This chapter is divided into two parts covering the burden sharing 
principle and the reception standard. The research will be conducted by analyzing the 
instruments through the capabilities-expectations gap as outlined in the previous chapter. This 
entails that I start outlining the aim and the instruments provided by the EU to make this 
instrument workable. Then I will outline how these instruments have been implemented and 
what problems they encountered before the Arab Spring.  
 
Subsequently, I will show how the instruments functioned during the Arab spring and whether 
they were able to provide refugee protection. For each instrument a conclusion will be drawn 
whether the instrument was able to fulfil its aim to protect refugees or not and what the 
reasons for failure or success were. 
 
3.1 Burden Sharing 
 ‘World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate 
to the dangers which threaten it’ (Schuman 1950) 
 
The creative efforts are in EU law illustrated by a series of generally acknowledged normative 
principles (Manners 2008). Two examples illustrating these creative efforts are the principles 
of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility. Throughout this research I will refer to them 
collectively as burden sharing. In literature and law more attention is given to the principle of 
solidarity than fair sharing of responsibility. Therefore throughout this section I will mainly 
refer to the principle of solidarity, unless stated differently.  Both entail the fair distribution of 
the burdens consequent to EU borders, immigration and asylum policy. Both underpin the 
responsibility of collective response to any kind of threat and should be capable of 
coordinating the migration influx into the EU.  As referred to in the previous chapter I will 
use burden sharing as a proxy to measure the capability of EU member states to protect 
refugees. If the burden sharing principle is not capable of achieving what it was meant to 
achieve, then this will result in Southern European countries having to deal with more asylum 
application processes than Northern countries. This will overheat the asylum system of the 
former countries. If this situation occurs, people in need of protection will not receive the 
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treatment and care that they should receive under an effective refugee protection system. 
Relating this back to my hypothesis this entails that:  
 
Hypothesis I: The bigger the gap between expectations and capabilities of internal EU 
border policy, the less effective EU refugee protection.  
 
The following section will first outline the aim of the solidarity principle and the principle of 
fair sharing of responsibility and stipulate how both principles should protect migrants. Then, 
I will show how the principles have been implemented and what further policies have been 
drafted. I will show what the implications of these policy instruments were during the Arab 
Spring and finally conclude whether the principles of burden sharing are able to protect 
refugees. 
 
3.1.1. OBJECTIVES AND LEGAL BASE  
This subsection will provide an overview of the foundational aims and legal bases of the 
principle of solidarity and the principle of fair sharing of responsibility. The relevance is 
twofold. On the one hand principles only work if implemented by a strong legal base. If a 
legal base is weak, all regulation founded on this base will be similarly weak. On the other 
hand, foundational aims are important as they give a framework to check if the instruments 
comply with the aims. Both will provide and answer on the question why expectations were 
(not) fulfilled.  
 
The solidarity principle is a broad principle demanding EU member states to act jointly and to 
assist one another in face of disasters, emergencies and crises facing the EU (Art. 222 TFEU). 
It underpins any collective response to any kind of threat, but also deals with the EU’s area of 
Freedom, Justice and Security. Article 67(2) TFEU refers to this principle of solidarity and 
should be read as the coordination of migration influx between EU countries. Furthermore, 
the article states that ‘criteria and mechanisms for determining which Member State is 
responsible for every migrant had to be developed’ (Art.67(2)). However, the EU did not 
stipulate these criteria and mechanism as prescribed in the Article.  
 
The principle of fair sharing of responsibility is a common framework on how genuine and 
practical solidarity should be built. Article 80 TFEU states that ‘(w)henever necessary, the 
Union acts adopted pursuant to this article contain appropriate measures to give effect to this 
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principle’ (Art.80 TFEU). In other words countries should take responsibility of the burden 
other member states face and that this should be shown by solidarity. The precise meaning of 
both provisions and the implications for EU institutions and member states is unclear. 
Especially as the principle of solidarity means different things to different people and member 
states (Myrdal and Rhinard 2010:1). For one, solidarity may entail the amount of support that 
flows to a member state in need. For another it could mean that every member state should act 
constantly in line with the agreements, and thus do their ‘homework’, in order to avoid a 
problematic situation (Myrdal and Rhinard 2010:1). In other words, if the principles of burden 
sharing remain rhetorical devices, it will be a difficult tool to use in practice (Myrdal and 
Rhinard 2010:4). The EU has not taken the appropriate measures as stipulated in art 80 TFEU. 
The principles remain unimplemented, and thus weak and unclear.  
 
The principles of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility were established in order to 
share the burden of the number of asylum procedures. Because the principles are not 
implemented they cannot be enforced. This situation gives too much room for own 
interpretation by member states. Only by fortifying the principles of solidarity and fair sharing 
of responsibility and providing better guidelines, will the principles be helpful effective in 
sharing the burden of migrants among member states.  
 
There have been attempts to clarify these principles in the Tampere programme (1999), the 
Hague Programme (2005) and the Stockholm Programme (2009) (Myrdal and Rhinard 
2010:4). I will focus on the Stockholm Programme as it was the latest stage before the Arab 
spring on clarification and mechanisms that should guide the burden sharing principles. 
 
3.1.2. IMPLEMENTATION 
Before the burden sharing principles were applied to migration policy, Northern EU states had 
very solid borders and a well regulated migration system. Together with the creation of the 
Schengen zone a new common migration policy had to be created. The Schengen system was 
a reflection of the border policy of the Northern European states. Southern European states 
did not want to dent their pride and so did not request for help during the implementation 
process. However, Southern states had to deal with most of the incoming migrants and they 
were not able to live up to the Schengen policy. Aided in part, by their resistance towards 
plans for more supervision of border policy (Parkes 2011b).  
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In December 2009, the Stockholm Programme was adopted to try and give more shape to 
burden sharing principles. The fair sharing of responsibilities and solidarity principles 
between the member states should, according to the Stockholm Programme, be ‘promoted’ 
especially with member states facing particular pressures. This should be achieved through a 
broad and balanced approach and mechanisms should be further analysed and developed (EC 
2010a). The most concrete measure stated is that member states should use, in a more 
effective way, existing EU financial systems aiming at reinforcing internal solidarity (EC 
2010a:71). Clearly, this ‘deepening’ of the solidarity principle remains unclear and does not 
give member states a guideline on how this principle should be read or implemented. Mainly 
northern countries have been giving little support for stricter regulation of the solidarity 
principle (Myrdal and Rhinard 2010:8). The problems that it caused in times of migration 
pressure are highlighted during the Arab Spring. 
 
3.1.3. THE ARAB SPRING 
During the Arab Spring it became clear that expectations of burden sharing not only came 
from Southern states. The expectation was that the Northern states as a result of the principle 
of solidarity would assist the Southern states. The Arab Spring highlights the weakness of the 
principles of solidarity and shared responsibility as stipulated by SIPRI. As a result of the 
large flow of refugees, caused by the uprisings, Southern European states faced large amounts 
of immigrants. Too many of them requested asylum, impossible for the recipient Southern 
states to handle (Caminelleri 2011). According to the burden sharing principles member states 
should assist those member states under strain. Were the Northern European member states 
willing to help the Southern States by taking asylum seekers for their account? 
 
In order to provide an answer to this question, data on asylum seekers applying for asylum in 
the member states is essential. In the first half of 2011, more than 75 percent of all asylum 
applications were made in 6 out of 27 member states. The UN identified 8000 people in need 
of help and the EU member states only promised to provide 400 of them shelter. In the 
meantime over 50,000 migrants crossed the Mediterranean Sea, arriving on the Italian island 
Lampedusa
10
 and on Malta. In May the European Commission’s first pledging – promises to 
house refugees - conference on Malta’s intra-EU resettlement pilot project for asylum seekers 
                                                             
10
 Lampedusa is an Italian Island an a prominent migration destination for those seeking to enter the EU (Heller 
et al. 2011:10) 
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was held (Caminelleri 2011). This was the possibility for EU member states to show their fair 
sharing of responsibility and solidarity. However, Malmström concluded after the conference 
that the EU could not impose solidarity on member states because their decisions in the area 
are sovereign (Malström 2011c). However, Malmström’s judgement was incomplete. The 
reason that member states acted in correspondence to their national interest was because of 
non-implementation of the principles. The result was that only 300 of the 50,000 refugees 
were relocated from Malta to one of the other member states (Caminelleri 2011).  
 
Another effort to motivate EU states to live up to both principles was in December 2011. The 
UNHCR organised a ministerial meeting in Geneva in order to motivate states to come to 
Geneva with pledges related to protection, assistance and durable solutions for refugees, 
including resettlement and local integration (UNHCR 2011). No pledges concerning 
resettlement came from the EU as member states were unable to agree on a joint pledge 
(Malmström 2012). This failure to effectively share the burden of migrants shows that the 
solidarity principle and the fair sharing of responsibility do not reflect the expectations. Yet, 
the weakness of these principles lies mainly in the non-implementation of the principles. The 
weakness became even more visible during the Arab Spring as the circumstances in Europe 
were not very supportive either. 
 
Solidarity Consequences for Schengen 
According to Cecilia Malmström the inability to implement the solidarity principle was not 
only caused by the large stream of migrants arriving on European territory. Also a lack of 
trust and the political mood negatively influenced the applicability of the solidarity principle. 
The lack of trust was mainly a result of the economic crisis in Europe. This crisis of 
confidence among Europe’s leaders influenced their capacity to find common solutions 
(Malmström 2012). The political mood in member states was not very favourably either. 
Since World War II there have not been so many populist and xenophobic parties in the 
political arena as in the last ten years (Malmström 2012). Arguably they exploit the current 
crisis trying to blame immigrants rather than poorly managed national economies. Moreover, 
as stated before, the number of migrants has not been this small in many years. The 
consequences of the inability of countries to enforce the solidarity principle became a bone of 
contention within the EU. Italy decided on 5 April 2011 to issue temporary residence permits 
to refugees granting them free circulation in the Schengen area (Pawlak 2011:38). As a result, 
a number of member states, led by France and Germany, accused Italy of infringing the 
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‘Schengen spirit’ and threatened to return border controls. Italian interior minister Maroni in 
turn accused his counterparts of failing to show solidarity: ‘Italy has been left alone’, he said, 
‘I wonder whether in this situation it makes sense to remain in the European Union’ (Marroni 
2011a). These actions and statements explain that not only the principles of burden sharing 
have failed these principles were harder to put into practice due to the unfavourable financial 
and political circumstances. This had a significant effect on the strength of the Schengen zone 
and the corresponding freedoms.  
 
3.1.4. FINDINGS 
This analysis shows that the burden sharing principles are not implemented as effective tools 
to bring countries to pledge for asylum seekers. Moreover, the analysis shows that the 
expectations of the burden sharing principle were different among Northern states compared 
to Southern states. These expectations could be different because the implementation of the 
principles lacked. Northern member states, aggravated by the unfavourable economic and 
political conditions were not willing to implement the solidarity principle. Southern states on 
the other hand were incapable to rely on their Northern counterparts when the situation 
became critical. This gap between willingness and expectations affected the trust between EU 
member states. When principles are not implemented, member states are apt to go for their 
national interest, certainly in unfavourable times. Therefore Malmström had to conclude that 
the EU under the given circumstances could not impose solidarity on the member states.  
 
3.2 Reception standards  
 
Reception standards are an integral part of the protection of refugees in Europe. A well-
organized registration system ensures the processing of the asylum request, and determines 
whether migrants are refugees or whether they are hoping for better financial future. Refugees 
are not received with open arms in EU member states. It is a lengthy and costly procedure, 
and the distinction between economical migrants and refugees is not always clear. The 
reception standards aim to guarantee refugee protection under European Law in line with the 
Geneva Convention. This section will investigate whether the standards agreed upon by 
member states and laid down in regulations and directive, were working in practice. 
Throughout this section the reception standards will be used both as proxy and as measuring 
instrument to check if refugee protection is effected as anticipated. As in the previous chapter 
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the capabilities-expectations gap will be the analysis devise to show the weaknesses and 
strengths of the instruments. The guiding hypothesis in this section will be:  
 
Hypothesis I: The bigger the gap between expectations and capabilities of internal EU 
border policy, the less effective EU refugee protection.  
 
This section is structured as follows. I will first outline the objectives of the regulations in the 
Treaty of Lisbon and the Reception Directive. Then I will look into the implementation and 
whether it ensured refugee protection during the Arab Spring. Rather then looking at all the 
member states, this section will focus on Greece and Italy as they were the two main recipient 
states (Frontex 2012b). Finally, this section will state whether there was a gap between what 
was expected to be possible in terms of reception standards and what European member states 
were able to deliver and in case of a gap whether this had affected the capabilities of the EU 
to protect refugees.  
 
3.2.1. OBJECTIVES AND LEGAL BASE 
This subsection will provide an overview of the foundational objectives and legal bases on 
which the reception of migrants in EU member states was built. The relevance is twofold. The 
foundational objectives are important as they give an insight into the purpose having a 
reception regulation. A strong legal base is important to implement the purpose of the 
objectives.  If a legal base if weak, all regulation founded on this base will be similarly weak.  
Objectives, legal base and regulations together will give a measure instrument to check if 
expectations were fulfilled. 
 
As noted since the Treaty of Amsterdam the EU has been working on a Common European 
Asylum System (CEAS). The main aim was to establish common procedural standards (Levy 
2005:28). These are stipulated in Article 78(2f) TFEU, as it calls for the establishment of 
standards for the reception of applicants for asylum or subsidiary protection. The majority of 
asylum seekers do not have the means to support themselves. This regulation stipulates that, 
while waiting for a decision on their claim, they must be provided with basic necessities, such 
as accommodation, housing and clothing.  
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The main standards
11
 for the reception of migrants, and thus also refugees, are laid down in a 
Directive established in 2003, referred to as the Reception Directive. The reception standards 
address standards for the arrival of the applicant, the provision of documents certifying his or 
her status as a asylum seeker including information on their rights, family unity, access to the 
labour market, healthcare, housing, food and clothing, and contact with legal advisers. If the 
asylum is refused, the applicant should have the possibility to appeal. Member states should 
also establish a mechanism to guide, monitor and control these policies (EUR-lex 2003).  
 
The main aim was to provide a secure environment for refugees throughout the EU. Whether 
these legal provisions are strong enough depends on the amendments and implementation by 
member states.  
 
3.2.2. IMPLEMENTATION 
The implementation of the Directive was obligatory and has a direct effect
12
 (Chalmers et al. 
2010: 286). An evaluation of the implementation of Directive 2003/9/EC by member states 
took place in 2007. This report states that the Commission addressed 19 member states 
informing them of the infringement or maladministration in the implementation of this 
Directive
13
. According to the report, serious concerns existed regarding the applicability of 
the Directive in all premises hosting asylum seekers. The UK, Belgium, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Luxemburg and Cyprus
14
 had infringed the Directive regarding the 
application of detention centres (EC 2007). Migrants were detained even though this was in 
breach with EU law. Several member states insufficiently informed the asylum seeker of their 
obligations and benefits under EU law. One of the reasons for this insufficient information 
provision was the lack of documents printed in the languages of the immigrants. This 
occurred in spite of the possibility for member states to request financial assistance from the 
European Refugee Fund in order to increase the number of languages in which the 
information was available. Moreover, not all member states have complied with the ruling of  
the Directive to provide asylum seekers with valid documentation. One issue considered all 
member states, as it describes that they all do not issue documents to the migrants placed in 
                                                             
11
 Council Directive 2003/9/EC 
12
 When a legal provision has a direct effect, citizens can directly rely on this provision before their national 
court, when the deadline for implementation has passed (Chalmers et al. 2010: 286) 
13
 The infringement of six member states was strong enough to bring the cases to the Court of Justice. Three of 
these were withdrawn and Austria was settled and the cases against Germany and Greece were still pending (EC 
2007:2) 
14
 The situation of Spain, Greece and Portugal was still unclear.   
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detention centres. For the procedure to withdraw reception standards only minor deficiencies 
were detected (EC 2007).  
 
The report concluded that besides non-implementation of parts of the directive in certain 
member states it is especially the  
 
‘wide discretion allowed by the Directive in a number of areas, notably in 
regard to access to employment, health care, level and form of material 
reception standards, free movement rights and needs of vulnerable persons 
undermines the objective of creating a level playing field in the area of 
reception standards’ (EC 2007:7).  
 
In other words: the Directive allows the member states a wide discretion, and this wide 
discretion undermines the objective of the Directive to create a level playing field in the area 
of common reception standards. The Directive is a weak instrument, too weak to enforce the 
member states to implement the objectives of the Directive in common national procedures. 
So the objective of the Directive to protect refugees is not met. This report was written in 
2007 and despite several repetitions of this report and requests by NGO’s for amendments, up 
to the Arab Spring no changes were made.  
 
3.2.3. THE ARAB SPRING 
The uprisings in the Arab world instigated a temporary crisis in migration patterns from North 
Africa. An increase in migrants arriving on European territory pushed the reception facilities 
to its limits. In spite of the common minimum rules for reception, and the recommendation on 
reception standards in several reports, member states were still not capable of acting in line 
with these minimum standards. Even though the deadline for the CEAS was set on 2012, 
negotiations are moving slow (Malmström 2012). The upcoming paragraphs will explain the 
inability of the reception facilities to protect refugees during the Arab Spring in two of the 
main recipient countries: Italy and Greece. 
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Italy 
From January until July 2011 over 55,000 migrants from North Africa arrived by boat on the 
Island Lampedusa, a small Italian island in the Mediterranean. Reception centres on 
Lampedusa were occasionally overwhelmed as it was initially equipped to hold 850 people. 
This forced the Italian government to request an emergency rule to relocate the refugees 
across all EU member states (Zaroug 2012). However as outlined in the previous chapter the 
response of European states was minimal. Another incident pushed Italy to its limits. A fire 
that was supposedly set by Tunisians destroyed most of a detention centre on the island. The 
government of Italy declared the detention centre as an unsafe port. HRW was one of the few 
NGO’s that was allowed into the reception and detention centre areas. They expressed their 
enduring concerns about the situation of asylum claims and standards in Italy (HRW 2012:8). 
Both the housing provisions and the ability of the Italian government to provide a ‘safe’ place 
seemed insufficient. This added to the unwillingness of EU counterparts to help and led to the 
decision of creating readmission agreements, as will be explained in chapter 4.1  
 
Greece 
Greece was unprepared for the stream of migrants coming from Arab countries. Even after an 
increase in refugee recognition rate to 12.35 percent critical problems with the asylum system 
persisted. Especially, the access to asylum and review of claims were not in line with the 
standards set out in the Reception Directive. One of the main causes was that a new asylum 
system was adopted in January 2011 and was only expected to become fully operational in 
2012. The standards of the detention centres were not living up to those set out in the 
Directive. According to HRW ‘migrants and asylum seekers, including women and families 
with children, continued to be detained in inhumane standards’ (HRW 2012:6). Moreover the 
problems Greece was facing were even harder to solve as of the fragile political and economic 
situation.  
 
In June 2011 a proposal of the European Commission to revise the Reception Directive was 
presented and approved by the European Parliament in October. Unfortunately this revision 
has come too late for the migrants of the Arab Spring
15
 (HRW 2012:2). 
 
                                                             
15
 The proposal includes broad grounds for detention, low standards on access to social assistance and healthcare, 
and expanded use of fast-track asylum procedures 
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3.2.4. FINDINGS 
This analysis shows that the reception standards were not able to protect refugees during the 
Arab Spring. There is a gap between the reception standards and the actual practice. The 
member states do not live up to the reception standards, as they do not provide assistance 
towards the large numbers of refugees in need of protection.  
 
The analysis also shows that the expectations of the reception of member states in terms of 
refugee protection were similar. Yet when implemented, the EC concluded in their evaluation 
report that besides non-implementation of parts of the Directive in certain member states it 
was particularly the ‘wide discretion allowed by the Directive in a number of areas’ that 
undermines the efficiency of the directive. In spite of several repetitions of this report and 
request by NGO’s for amendments, up to the Arab Spring no changes were made.  
 
A reason for this could be that there was no pressure in the two years prior to the Arab Spring 
especially because of the significant decrease in number of migrants in 2009 and 2010. This 
decrease in migrants, as later explained, was caused by the externalization of EU border 
policy. Thus this decrease in migrant pressure, possibly led to the disdain of countries to live 
up to the implementation.   
 
During the Arab Spring both Italy and Greece proved to be unprepared for the influx of 
migrants. Reports of NGO’s and newspaper articles indeed show that it was less realistic for 
especially bordering countries to protect the refugees according to EU law. In other words the 
expectations of a strong and solid European reception system were not reflected in the 
instruments to protect refugees and in the capabilities of the member states to grant protection. 
The weakness of the instrument was articulated in the non-implementation or mal-
implementation and the wide discretion allowed by the Directive.  
 
 
4. EXTERNAL BORDER POLICY 
 
Having discussed the internal border policy instruments, I will now shed light on the 
objectives, implementation and actual performance of the external border policy. Partnership 
agreements with third countries and border policy instruments at sea should prevent the influx 
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of illegal migrants and simultaneously look after those in need of protection. The following 
two chapters will asses the instruments that should ensure refugee protection, and will apply 
them to the case of the Arab Spring.  
 
Each chapter analyses the instruments of external border policy and whether they protect 
refugees sufficiently. If not, this chapter will analyse to what extent this is caused by the 
insufficiency and ineffectiveness of the instruments. These weaknesses of EU external border 
policy instruments probably give way to the dominance of intergovernmentalism.  
 
4.1 Partnership with third countries 
Migration issues have increasingly converged upon various areas of cooperation between the 
EU and third countries. This induced an enactment of the EU to ‘adopt a cross pillar approach 
to migration, with an emphasis on financial aid for third countries to foster developments in 
order to reduce the irregular migration’ (Pinyol-Jimenes 2011). In other words, EU border 
security did not just stop at the border but was externalised to third countries. In this section, I 
will investigate to what extent this externalisation of border control affected the capability of 
the EU to protect those in need. I argue that cooperation between the EU and third countries 
has not been supplemented by enough strong refugee protection instruments. In order to find 
out whether the third country agreements were near-sighted, the guiding hypothesis for this 
section will be: 
 
Hypothesis III: The more cooperation between the EU and third countries on controlling 
migration, the less it was possible to protect refugees.  
 
For purposes of clarification, this section will first briefly outline the background of third 
country partnerships, the ENP, the regulation in the TFEU and what these institutions aim to 
accomplish. Rather than focussing on all the third country partnerships, I will focus on the 
cooperation partnerships between Libya and Italy.  This is followed by an outline of the 
effects of these partnerships during the Arab Spring and new partnerships that have been 
developed in 2011 to deal with the stream of migrants caused by the Arab Spring.  Finally, I 
will outline my findings and show the effects of the externalisation of borders to third 
countries on the ability of EU member states to protect refugees.  
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4.1.1. OBJECTIVES AND LEGAL BASE  
This subsection will provide the objectives of partnership agreements and the legal base on 
which they are founded. When the objective of partnership agreements is aimed at the 
prevention of incoming irregular migrants and this is similarly articulated in the legal base, 
then the legal base will not provide enough means to secure refugees. However if this legal 
base is sufficiently supplemented by refugee protection measures then the chances are higher 
that this will be the case in practice as well. 
 
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was developed in 2004, with the intention of 
avoiding the emergence of dividing lines between an enlarged EU and its neighbours. It was 
aimed at strengthening the prosperity, stability and security of all its inhabitants. The ENP is 
mainly a bilateral policy between the EU and each of its neighbours. These countries include 
the North African states Egypt, Libya and Tunisia (Fraser 2012:61). Strengthening ties with 
the neighbours was based on a mutual benefit. In the case of controlling irregular migration, 
EU member states had made arrangements with the transit countries through which most of 
the migrants came. A regulation stipulating this partnership is article 78 of the TFEU. This 
legal base stipulates that these agreements have the purpose to manage inflows of people 
applying for asylum or subsidiary or temporary protection. However as this chapter will 
explain the objectives do not seem to reflect the purpose stipulated in this regulation.  
 
Aims of partnership agreements 
Partnership agreements have three main objectives. Firstly, an important objective is to 
prevent and reduce illegal immigration. This can entail cooperation within the third country, 
by creating housing facilities and detention centres, but also helping them to increase their 
own border control or increasing maritime control in their waters. Secondly it can entail 
strong action to prevent trafficking and smuggling of human beings (Meccanico 2012; Cuttitta 
2010; Nascimbene and Di Pascale 2011). Thirdly, returning those migrants that do not fulfil 
the criteria of asylum seekers. Surrounding, this last aim, a lot of controversy exists. 
Agreements articulating this are referred to as readmission policies
16
.  
 
                                                             
16 These agreements aim at imposing a ‘reciprocal obligation on the issuing third member 
states, upon application and without any further formality, their nationals if they do not or no 
longer fulfil the conditions for entry, presence or residence in the territory of the requesting 
state’ (EC 2009). 
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To summarize, the purpose of the legal base is managing the inflow of people applying for 
asylum or subsidiary or temporary protection. This purpose seems to stand in contrast to the 
objectives. The objective is to prevent people from coming to EU territory. However nowhere 
is stipulated how refugees will be protected in the third country and how those refugees 
asking for protection can do so if they do not have the possibility to flee to the EU. The 
following case study on the partnership between the EU, Italy specifically and Libya will 
clarify this opaque link between objectives and legal purpose.  
 
Partnerships between the EU and Libya 
As noted, this research will shed light on the bilateral relationship between Libya and Italy. 
Libya was the main sending country during the Arab Spring and had strong historically rooted 
strings with Italy, the main recipient country (Frontex 2012b). Background information on the 
agreement is essential in order to clarify the motives to cooperate with Libya in the first place.  
 
The EU, Italy and Libya: a partnership agreement based on a dual gain 
The partnership between Italy and Libya started in 1998 with a police cooperation agreement. 
However, it was not until 2004 when EU diplomats expressed that cooperation with Libya on 
migration was essential and urgent. Moreover, the EU reiterated its concern about the level of 
illegal traffic across the Mediterranean from, or via, Libya (CEU 2011:7)
17
. Yet, there were 
more benefits that would be gained from a partnership agreement. The EU’s interest in a 
cooperation agreement was twofold: emigrational centric and economical.  
 
In terms of migration it was a dual gain. Both the EU and Libya were experiencing the 
negative effects of migration flows coming from Libya. The latter has always been an 
important country of destination for migrants from Africa and Asia. Additionally, since 2007 
Libya has become a country of transit to Europe for legal as well as illegal immigration (ENP 
2010). Libya became the most popular transit country as a result of several factors. Firstly, the 
efforts by Spain and Morocco to control irregular migration to Europe diverted the migration 
routes from Western Africa and Morocco to Central Africa. Secondly, the border controls in 
Tunisia had been strengthened, which also explains why Tunisian migrants chose to depart 
                                                             
17 This refers to the decision by Libyan authorities in 2003 to disclose and dismantle their nuclear chemical and 
biological weapons programs and to take some responsibility for the bombings in the airplanes in 1988 and 1989 
(CEU 2011:7) 
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from Libya even though it was further away from Europe. A third significant reason lies in the 
proximity of Libya to conflict zones in Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea.  
 
As noted partnership agreements were also based on economic gains. In 2006 Libya was the 
third largest supplier of oil to Europe (ENP 2010:42), which does not only make Libya an 
important country for political cooperation but also makes it an economically attractive 
partner. On the side of Libya economic cooperation was also attractive as in 2007 EU member 
states accounted for seventy percent of Libya’s trade (Gianiou 2010).  
 
4.1.2. IMPLEMENTATION  
To deal with the irregular migration coming from Libya, several migration agreements have 
been instigated. In 1998, the Italian government started talks on the joint management of 
irregular migration. This cooperation between Italy and Libya has focused on three aspects: 
police cooperation, maritime cooperation and readmission cooperation. On these three aspects 
agreements were established.  
 
Police cooperation 
The first agreement was signed in 2000. In this agreement Libya and Italy decided to 
cooperate to fight terrorism, organised crime, drugs traffic and illegal immigration, and an 
Italian investigation unit was established in Tripoli in May 2003 (EC 2005:15). Two months 
later, an executive agreement was signed, but its contents have never been made public (EC 
2005:15). 
 
Readmission 
Readmission agreements do not only cover the nationals of the contracting countries but also 
non-nationals and stateless persons, who entered the EU through that country (Carerra and 
Hernández i Sagrera 2009:6; Coleman 2009). Until September 2004, all migrants sent by 
Italian authorities back to Libya were admitted to Libyan territory. Ultimately, Libya 
approved to readmit unauthorized migrants removed from Italy, even though no readmission 
agreement was signed (Cuttitta 2010:34). A formal readmission programme has not been 
signed until the creation of the Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 2009.  
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Maritime cooperation 
Italy received a considerable amount of criticism on returning migrants from Lampedusa to 
Libya by European member states in 2004 and 2005. Italy, therefore, found a new way to 
strengthen their ties with Libya in order to restrict the number of migrants on their soil. Italy 
convinced Libya to let her control the maritime border regions. This was the first time that 
Italian boats were allowed in Libyan territorial waters (Klepp 2011:5). Simultaneously with 
‘the introduction of joint naval patrols by Italy in May 2009, the amount of illegal migrants 
arriving in Italy and Malta from Libya has fallen sharply’ (EC 2010b:42).  
 
The Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation
18
 between Italy and Libya had as 
aimed to strengthen peace, security and stability in the Mediterranean region, but was mainly 
centred around the readmission of migrants from Italy and its support to Libyan patrols in the 
Mediterranean fighting clandestine migration. This treaty has been ratified by Italy on 6 
February 2009 and was certainly effective. Nevertheless, according to the European 
Parliament it was at the cost of migrants human rights. In 2009 nearly 1000 people were 
returned to Libya by Italy after being rescued or intercepted at sea. According to Italy’s 
Minister of the Interior there was a plunge of 96 percent in the first quarter of 2010 compared 
to 2009 (EP 2010).  
 
Framework agreement 
Negotiation on a partnership agreement - framework agreement - between Libya and the EU 
started in 2009. This agreement aimed at ‘the full reintegration of Libya in bilateral and 
multilateral international relations’ and at a productive political dialogue on issues of common 
interest. One of the requests of the EU was a readmission agreement. Nevertheless, the Libyan 
authorities had no intention of accepting this. The framework agreement has never been 
signed and was still in the negotiation phase when the Arab Spring commenced (EP 2010). 
The reaction of the European Parliament on the readmission proposal in the framework 
agreement on this aspect was that ‘given the systematic disregard for human rights in Libya 
and the persistence of torture and death penalty, it is unconscionable that the Council of 
                                                             
18
 This Treaty stipulates that both countries confirm not to use force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of the other party or any means incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations (article 3). 
Moreover the treaty states that both countries shall not interfere with the internal affairs of the other and that 
Italy shall not allow the use of its territory in any hostile act against Libya (article 4). 
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Europe and the European Commission seek such an agreement to forcefully return people to 
Libya’ (EP 2010). Still negotiations continued. 
 
When migrants were not able to arrive in Europe, being sent back without receiving the 
formal procedure of reception and asylum request, what were the conditions for migrants in 
Libya? These conditions may give some insights in whether sending them back or preventing 
them from arriving on European soil was legitimate or not. 
 
 
Migration standards in Libya 
Migrants from Western and Eastern African countries did not only migrate for work 
opportunities but also because many were occasionally subject to collective expulsions and 
acts of mass violence (ENP 2010:7). Yet, the precise and detailed data on the number of 
migrants are not available as there is no institution in Libya that keeps record. Rough 
estimations of the Libyan authorities are that approximately between 600,000 to 700,000 legal 
foreign immigrants are living in Libya. Another 1.2 or 1.5 million migrants are residing in 
Libya on an illegal basis (ENP 2010:8). These numbers were substantial and they became 
more and more a quagmire for the Libyan authorities. Furthermore, a strategy paper created 
by the ENP indicates that Libya is not a source country for migration to Europe. In other 
words the migrants coming from Libya do not have the Libyan nationality themselves  
 
Looking at the rights and circumstances of the repatriation destination Libya, one can hardly 
say it is appealing. Only amounting for migrant facilities, the EC reported in 2005 stated that 
the conditions of detention centres varied from relatively acceptable to extremely poor, and 
with some centres did not even housing unaccompanied minors and women in separate 
accommodation (EC2005:14). Outside these centres, migrants were not looked upon as 
favourable guests. In contrast, with an increasing number of migrants the local population 
became ‘increasingly ambivalent about the migrants, some of whom are accused of carrying 
diseases, endangering security and negatively impacting the economy’ (ENP 2010:40). 
 
In 2007, the Association for Legal Studies on Immigration (ASGI) reported that hundreds of 
asylum seekers, including many Eritreans, and vulnerable groups like women and children, 
were imprisoned in detention centres in Libya (ASGI 2007). Already in 2007 it was well 
known that migrants in detention centres in Libya were being mistreated. In 2010 UNHCR 
 39 
stated that Libyan authorities deported a group of 245 Eritreans, some of which had been 
beaten during their stay in Libya, back to Eritrea knowing full well that they could face torture 
in their home country (ASGI 2007). 
 
Moreover, Libyan law makes no distinction between asylum seekers and economic migrants 
(Gianiou 2010). This means that refugees will not receive protection of any kind. When 
exploring Libya’s legal framework, the EC acknowledged in 2004, and again in 2010, the fact 
that Libya is not a signatory of the Geneva Convention on the protection of refugees, nor did 
Libya have an asylum procedure or did it make a distinction between economic migrants and 
refugees. Also there were no regulations or procedures to ensure protection and respect of 
migrants rights In order to partly obey the EU request for more human rights recognition, 
Libyan authorities created new institutions dealing with anti-infiltration and illegal 
immigration issues. Still, all these bodies were in the development phase when the Arab 
Spring unfolded (ENP 2010b: 40). 
 
Disturbingly, Libyan authorities repatriated migrants as well. An estimated 43,000 irregular 
migrants were repatriated in 2003, 54,000 in 2004 and 48,000 in 2005. According to a report 
of the European Commission on illegal migration in Libya ‘(m)any of the illegal immigrants 
in the centres seem to have been arrested on a random basis. The decision to return illegal 
immigrants to their country of origin seems to be taken for groups of nationalities rather than 
after having examined individual cases in detail’ (Emphasis added) (EC 2005:14). In other 
words, no distinction was made between economic migrants and refugees. 
 
Partnership agreements should make it possible to better regulate migration and thus also to 
provide a better treatment to migrants who eventually arrive on European soil. On the other 
hand police cooperation and maritime cooperation can possibly prevent people in need of 
protection to reach Europe. Partnership agreements were not able to protect refugees prior to 
the Arab Spring. The migrants that did arrive had the chance to be sent back to Libya, where 
no rules of protection or care applied to them and where they had the risk of being imprisoned 
or sent back to their home country irrespective of the danger for their lives. The reaction of 
the Italian government and the EU is important, as it allows us to determine what action they 
undertook to ‘keep’ providing assistance to refugees.  
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4.1.3. THE ARAB SPRING 
Uprisings in Libya commenced in February 2011 and rebel forces were determined to 
continue until Muammar Gaddafi was overthrown as president of Libya. The death toll in 
Libya was with 30.000 significantly higher than in other countries facing uprisings in 2011 
with another 50.000 people were wounded (Milne 2011). The uprisings succeeded in 
overthrowing the government on the 23th of August 2011. Clearly, with the uprisings in 
Libya, the Libyan authorities were not able and willing anymore to live up to the partnership 
agreements (Sengupta 2011). 
 
As noted, Libya had been working closely with Europe and especially with Italy, in order to 
control borders and regulated and restrain the irregular migration of Sub Saharan Africans and 
North Africans to Europe (Hamood 2008). Gaddafi used oil and migration issues as tools to 
control its partnership with the EU.  In the wake of the unexpected (United Nations) UN 
security Council resolution and subsequent attacks by British, French and American forces, 
Gaddafi announced that he would stop cooperation with Europe in stemming irregular 
migration from Libya. Moreover, he threatened that if the Europeans continued to support the 
protesters, he would open the migration floodgates and would send boats filled with migrants 
from north Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa to the European coasts. This message was 
confirmed by Libyan officials admitting they were not allowed to prevent African migrants 
from crossing the Mediterranean Sea (Sengupta 2011). Gaddafi even commenced to 
encourage people smugglers to transport even more people as a revenge for European 
countries backing the rebels and NATO bombing his forces. The result was that even more 
people were shipped across the Mediterranean in ‘leaky boats and the resultant tragedy of 
dozens of dead bodies washing up on Europe's southern shores’ (Sengupta 2011). Those still 
left in Libya are trapped in camps and terrified of prosecution by the rebels who might accuse 
them of being supporters of the old regime. 
 
An increasing number of deaths of migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea and an increasing 
pressure at Italy’s formal detention centres, Reception Centres for Asylum Aeekers (CARAs) 
and centres for identification and expulsion (CIEs), scared the Italian authorities who called 
the state of emergency. On the 24
th
 of February 2011 at the meeting in Brussels of the  
Council of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) (Sengupta 2011). Italian Minister of Interior 
Roberto Maroni called on Europe to take ‘all measures necessary to cope with a catastrophic 
humanitarian crisis’. He expected an ‘invasion of one million, one million and half people 
 41 
who would put any country on their knees.’ (Maroni 2011a). Other EU member states were 
not impressed by the potential humanitarian crisis and eventually made 25 million euro’s 
extra available to deal with the large streams of refugees.  
 
Even before the government was overthrown, on the 17
th
 of June 2011 Italy reached a 
readmission agreement with the head of Libya’s interim rebel government after recognizing it 
as the country’s legitimate authority. In a conference in Naples the Italian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Franco Frattini stated that ‘This accord shows how close the collaboration is between 
Italy and the National Transitional Council (NTC) (...) and how serious the NTC considers 
cooperation with countries that have recognised it,’ (Frattini 2011a). ASGI criticized the 
agreement on several points. Firstly, according to them the text was not disclosed to the 
public. Second, the agreement was made with a governing party that was not in command of 
the entire country and thus representing the full population. Thirdly, Libya had never signed 
the Geneva Convention protecting refugees, making the situation even more questionable. 
Fourthly, at the moment the agreement was signed, Libya was no ‘safe haven’ as military 
operations were still ongoing (Meccanico 2012:4). 
 
4.1.4. FINDINGS 
The objective of partnership agreements was to prevent illegal migrants from arriving on EU 
territory and to provide a better treatment to migrants who eventually arrived on European 
soil. This, however, had a disturbing downside: police cooperation and maritime cooperation 
deterred people while fleeing to Europe from arriving. Partnership agreements clearly were 
not able to protect refugees prior to the Arab Spring. In excess, migrants that did arrive on 
European territory had the chance to be sent back to Libya, where no rules of protection or 
care applied to them and where they had the risk to be imprisoned in detention centres or send 
back to their home country irrespective of the danger for their lives.  
 
Did more cooperation between the EU and third countries on controlling migration result in 
an inability of the EU to protect refugees? The analysis shows that the partnership agreements 
with Libya were problematic prior to the Arab Spring. Moreover it shows that when 
partnerships are agreed upon with a country that does not recognize human rights and that 
does not differentiate between migrants and refugees, migrants are mistreated, and on a 
random basis send back to their country of origin, that it is irresponsible to prevent those in 
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need, by police and maritime agreements from travelling to Europe or sent people back 
irrespective of their right on safety in the transit country.  
 
During the Arab Spring more negative characteristics of partnership agreements came to light. 
Firstly, the EU and Italy especially, had to face their dependence on partnership agreements. 
Without the maritime and police cooperation Italy was clearly unprepared for the greater 
number of arriving migrants. Moreover, Libya is not a reliable democratic partner but is rather 
referred to as a ‘rogue’ state. Gaddafi took revenge and threatened to send even more people 
by vessels to Europe. The partnerships are based on soft law meaning that they are unbinding 
and can be annulled at every point in time. 
 
In order to control the flows of migrants caused by the uprisings in the Arab world, Italy 
attempted to re-establish the readmission agreements with the new regimes in Tunisia and 
Libya. By declaring a state of emergency they justified derogating important laws like asylum 
procedures and used the fast-track application process. Calling for a state of emergency
19
 is an 
excessive measure when looking at the number of migrants and reasons justifying this. To 
date no check and balances system or democratic accountability mechanism is valid the EU. 
However this state of emergency has not been that exceptional as according to scholar Yasha 
Maccanico Italy declared a state of emergency several times before.
 20
 The structural calling 
of a state of emergency has been taken too lightly and has severe implications for the 
treatment of migrants (Mecanico 2012). 
 
Partnership agreements, also when justifying them by calling a state of emergency, undermine 
the non-refoulement procedure. This procedures stipulates that no state ‘shall expel or return a 
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom 
would be threatened’. Preventing migrants from arriving on European territory or sending 
them back without having a full asylum procedure infringes this principle. Moreover, during 
the Arab Spring migrants, most of them of African background, were send back despite the 
                                                             
19 Art. 15 of the ECHR: ‘In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High 
Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other 
obligations under international law’ (Apap and Carrera 2003:403). 
20
 On December, 11 2002, November 7, 2003, December 23, 2007, February 14, 2008, July 25and November 19 
, 2009 (Maccanico 2012). 
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knowledge that there was a witch-hunt for this group of people being accused of serving the 
mercenary army of Gaddafi (Meccanico 2012). 
 
The objective was to deter illegal migrants from arriving on European soil and to protect those 
in need. However partnership agreements were made with states where migrants are not safe 
or protected, or faced the possibility to be sent back to their country of origin irrespective of 
their safety. Despite this knowledge, and without the right mechanisms to protect those in 
need of protection, partnership agreements with these kind of states were growing in number. 
The greater this number, the more difficult it became to protect those in need.  
 
 
4.2 European border policy at sea 
 
Having discussed the aspects of European border policy in third countries and its effects on 
the protection of refugees and migrants, I will now shed light on the operational practices of 
EU border policy in the Mediterranean Sea. The importance of the Mediterranean in the EU 
border policy can be deducted from the fact that in 2011 86percent of the detections of 
irregular migrants occurred on the EU’s external borders of which 46percent took place in the 
Central Mediterranean and Eastern Mediterranean Sea (Frontex 2012). In this section, I will 
test the operations of the EU border policy at sea by using the capability-expectations gap. 
This section begins by pointing out the main aims and instruments of the EU border policy at 
sea. Then I will focus on the implementation by member states of EU mechanisms to protect 
refugees at sea and the EU’s main maritime border policy instrument, Frontex. Finally, I will 
show whether Frontex was able to protect refugees during the Arab Spring.  
 
In this section I argue that the initial aim of border patrols in the Mediterranean which set out 
to prevent the arrival of irregular migration, (Frontex 2012a) does not reflect the principle of 
non-refoulement. The foundation upon which sea border regulation was built proved to be 
weak, all regulation founded on this base will be similarly weak. Therefore an increase in the 
number of regulations in the past served only to widen the gap between what the policy was 
expected to achieve and what could be realised in terms of refugee protection. The guiding 
hypothesis for this section will be: 
 
Hypothesis III: the more border controls at sea, the less effective EU refugee protection. 
 44 
4.2.1. OBJECTIVES AND LEGAL BASE  
A strong legal base is essential for any good policy. If a legal base if weak, all regulation 
founded on this base will be similarly weak. Foundational aims are important as they give an 
insight into the purpose of the instruments. Both can explain why expectations were not 
fulfilled. 
 
The Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius (1916) noted in 1609 in his Mare Liberum that the high seas 
cannot be subject to national jurisdiction and can only be governed by residual principle of 
freedom allowing vessels of all nations the right of passage, trade and exploitations. However 
together with this freedom, a legal duty to render assistance to those in need of protection at 
sea was also established (Grotius 1916:1). 
 
The EU however has created regulations enabling sea patrols which primarily serve to prevent 
illegal migrants from reaching EU territory. From the 1990s onwards along with 
strengthening the freedom of movement within the EU for its citizens, restrictions were 
augmented on the entry of non-European migrants. As a result, migrants have increasingly 
tried to enter EU territory via illegal sea routes. EU policies and instruments aiming to halt 
this clandestine migration have succeeded in some areas. However, EU policies have sparked 
a splintering of migrants routes throughout the Mediterranean, causing an increase in 
dangerous points of passage (Bigo and Guild 2005:143). 
 
Along with the increase of sea border regulation, a division of responsibilities seemed 
necessary (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Aalberts 2010:7-8). As noted, EU law is subject to 
international law and therefore the EU had to implement Search and Rescue (SAR) zones. 
This Convention aims to create an international system for coordinating rescue operations and 
guaranteeing their efficiency and safety. Each member state has the responsibility over a 
different maritime area. Additionally and in line with the 1951 Geneva Convention, the 
Convention stipulates that states are not only obliged to rescue people in need of protection, 
they also have a duty to disembark rescued persons in a safe place (Trevisanut 2010:524). 
 
Coastal states have a prime responsibility in securing the EU border. They have ‘to ensure 
arrangements for distress communication and coordination in their area of responsibility and 
for the rescue of persons in distress at sea around their coasts’ (Heller et al. 2012:26). Aware 
that Mediterranean states have their own policy regarding sea patrols, the EU has created 
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several agencies
21
 to manage SAR operations. Among these, two were given the task to 
combat human trafficking; Europol and Frontex. Europol is the main institution focused on 
the gathering of intelligence while Frontex coordinates sea patrols. 
 
The Frontex Agency was set up in 2004 and became operational in 2005. Its primary 
responsibility is to coordinate joint operations of member states with the aim to prevent the 
arrival of irregular migrants. In these operations the equipment is equally provided by 
member states of the EU. However Frontex neither has a protection mandate nor particular 
human rights expertise (Simone 2010). I will focus on migrants arriving via the Central 
Mediterranean route as this route provided the highest number of irregular migrant arrivals in 
2011 (Frontex 2012). 
 
To summarize, the legal basis was not weak as such as there was a legal duty to render 
assistance to those in need of protection at sea. The SAR zones had the aim to simplify sea 
patrols for countries and Frontex had to coordinate the actions of member states, which would 
in theory increase refugee protection. However, the foundational aims of Frontex and border 
policy at sea in general, were also controversial as they were focused on preventing and 
tackling immigration. Therefore it depends on the implementation of these regulations and the 
ability to separate those in need of protection from economic migrants to see whether the 
instruments were capable of protecting refugees. 
 
4.2.1 IMPLEMENTATION 
Effective implementation of the instruments is necessary as otherwise the realisation of their 
objectives will be hindered. Both the materialization of instruments for coastal states and of 
the instruments deployed by Frontex, appeared to be a complex matter. To commence, there 
seems to be little clarity on the responsibilities of member states in their SAR zones. Italy and 
Malta for example, have been locked in continuous dispute since they signed different 
versions of the SAR convention (see Figure 2). Italy has signed the amendments of the SAR 
convention in 2004 stipulating that migrants should be disembarked on the territory of the 
SAR zone where the vessel was found. The SAR zone of Malta is 750 times larger than its 
territory and Malta has therefore refused to ‘ratify these amendments for fears that it would 
                                                             
21
 EMSA (European Maritime Safety Agency), Frontex, EPN (European Patrol Network); ERA-NET (European 
Research Area Network), EU LRIT DC (EU Long Range Identification and Tracking Data Centre; SafeSeaNet 
(European vessel traffic monitoring and information system) (Trevisanut 2010: 537). 
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impose unrealistic obligations to disembark migrants rescued by other states and private 
vessels’ (Heller et al. 2012:9). Consequently, it still acts in accordance with the old regulation 
that rescued persons should be disembarked on the territory of the nationality of the ship. 
 
This provoked a series of incidents where migrants were rescued in Malta’s SAR zone but 
closer to the Italian islands Lampedusa and Pantelleria. This brought about a lengthy conflict 
during which migrants have died. A number of confrontations between Italian and Maltese 
naval vessels ‘literally trying to block each other from entering its territorial waters and 
disembark rescued migrants’ (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Aalberts 2010). In other words, the 
lack of clarity of this provision has caused the lives of those in need of protection. 
 
Figure 2 
 
Italian and Maltese SAR Zones (Caffio 2007:143) 
 
What were the tools of Frontex to employ their tasks? One of its tools was the ability to create 
joint maritime operations with member states such as operations Hera I, II, and III. The aim of 
these operations was to reduce the number of vessels arriving in Spain’s Canary Island 
(Frontex 2012). The operations were a success in term of achieving the goal of a significant 
Malta 
Italy 
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decrease in boats arriving on European territory. Notably, perhaps unintentionally, this has 
also prevented migrants- including refugees- to make use of the procedural rights that apply 
within EU territory (HRW 2011). The regulations for Rapid Border Intervention Teams 
(RABITs) supplemented the tools of Frontex in July 2007. This tool of Frontex endeavoured 
to stop the arrival of migrants. Furthermore it stated that ‘while performing their tasks and 
exercising their powers, members of the teams shall be authorised to use force’ (Frontex 
2007). 
 
In 2008, the Standing Committee of the United Nations High Commisoner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) argues in a statement that the EU used Frontex as a deterrence campaign in which 
‘intentionally or not - asylum seekers are being blocked from claiming protection under the 
1951 Refugee Convention’ (ICVH 2008). This statement called upon the EC to strengthen 
regulation in order to identify those in need of protection and more specific to grant them the 
right to use this protection. In addition the UNHCR report stressed that it agreed with the 
enforcement focus to prevent illegal immigration, but that at least as much attention should be 
given to the protection of refugees and migrants in need of protection (ICVH 2008). In other 
words, Frontex fulfilled its tasks to prevent migrants from reaching EU territory but was 
unable to simultaneously provide protection to migrants. To overcome these problems the EC 
granted Frontex more responsibility. In the Council Decision of April 26, 2010 the EC 
supplemented Frontex’ tasks with the surveillance of the maritime external borders (EC 
2010b). 
 
4.2.3. THE ARAB SPRING 
The collapse of the Tunisian and Libyan regimes instigated a temporary crisis in migration 
patterns from North Africa, with an increase in the number of migrants attempting to cross the 
Mediterranean into Europe and an increase in the number of migrants losing their lives in this 
attempt. According to the UNHCR 2011 was the ‘deathliest year’ in the Mediterranean since 
2006 with an estimation of over 1500 migrants death (Heller et al. 2012:9). During the Arab 
Spring, ships of Frontex and EU member states were not the only vessels surveying the 
Mediterranean for migrants. NATO ships were also patrolling. However, they were not able 
to protect refugees. Yet, is it to blame on the increase in tasks and responsibilities given to 
Frontex and the already weak SAR system? First, this section will lay down the reaction to the 
flow of migrants stemming from the uprising in the Arab world and then it will use the ‘Left-
to-Die Boat Case’ to see whether these EU instruments were able to protect migrants. 
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At request of the Italian government and as a response to these challenges posed, the EU 
launched the Frontex Joint Operation Hermes Extension 2011 on the 20th of February. This 
operation was aimed at assisting Italian authorities in handling the ongoing and upcoming 
flows of migrants (Frontex 2011a). Frontex main responsibilities were to patrol the 
Mediterranean area, to prevent border crossings, to gather information necessary for analysis, 
aid in the identification of migrants, and to predict and prevent the possibility of criminal 
activities at the EU’s external borders. Later, it also included support for return operations of 
migrants to their countries of origin. The operation was placed under the guidance of Italy, 
and marine equipment and crews were provided by the Italian authorities. Equally, RABIT, 
which for the first time ever provided border management support at the Greece-Turkey land 
border, contributed to a reduction of 75percent in the number of irregular crossings during its 
deployment. 
 
As noted 1.500 migrants had died at sea and it remains unclear whether their lives could have 
been saved. To date, one situation, alternatively called the ‘left-to-die boat case’ has been 
investigated. A vessel with 72 migrants was on its way from Tripoli to Lampedusa when it 
started to experience difficulties caused by a lack of fuel, food and water supplies on March 
27 2011 (Heller et al. 2012:9). The captain of the vessel contacted a priest in Italy who rapidly 
alarmed the Coast Guard. In the mean time Spanish and Italian military were within reach of 
the vessel. Yet, neither of them mobilized to rescue the migrants and 63 migrants died before 
they arrived back in Libya two weeks after departure. Italian authorities say that they fulfilled 
their obligations and were not obliged to do more. Maltese authorities confirm they received 
information of the call, but say that Italy made no requests for assistance. Thus a lack of 
clarity in responsibilities, caused the inability of EU member states to protect refugees. 
Furthermore, fishermen and other private ship masters were too afraid to rescue migrants in 
the fear of being criminalized if they help small boast in distress as transporting illegal 
migrants is the Italian governmentof the vessel in distress. In November 2011 Frontex wrote a 
response letter after a request by several NGO’s explaining the scope and location of its 
mission. Frontex provided the coordination of the operational area. The information given in 
the letter states that the trajectory of the ‘Left-to-Die Boat Case’ never entered any of 
Frontex’s operational areas (Heller et al. 2012:27). Moreover the actual deployment of 
equipment by Frontex was mainly delivered by Italy and only minimal equipment was 
provided by other member states. 
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A lack of clarity on responsibility added by a lack of accountability of the parties involved 
resulted in the death of 63 people. This tells us that  the past two decades of European anti-
immigration policies have ‘left their mark on how search and rescue operations are carried out 
in the Mediterranean, and have needlessly put at serious risk the lives of hundreds of 
migrants’ (Heller et al. 2012:9). 
 
4.2.4. FINDINGS 
The legal basis of sea border policy was not weak as there was a legal duty to render 
assistance to those in need of protection at sea. The SAR zones had the aim to simplify sea 
patrols for countries and Frontex had to coordinate the actions of member states, which would 
in theory increase refugee protection. Yet, there exists some controversy on the foundational 
aims of Frontex, and on border policy at sea in general. Both were focused on preventing and 
tackling immigration. Even though member states may claim that preventing the loss of life in 
the Mediterranean is one of the key elements of anti-immigration policy, results suggests that 
lives of migrants were put at risk. Securing member states against illegal migrants and giving 
protection to those in need before reaching the actual border is controversial. 
 
This controversy becomes clear when looking at the implementation. Protection of refugees 
could not be guaranteed because of two main reasons. Firstly, the determination of the place 
to which rescued persons should have been escorted under the arrangements stipulated in the 
SAR Convention were unclear. Malta and Italy both claimed not to be responsible for the 
migrants dying in the ‘Left-to-Die Boat Case’ during the Arab Spring. The first conclusion 
that can be drawn from this is that the SAR convention is too weak to protect refugees as a 
result of the fact that it possible for countries to be signatories of different SAR conventions, 
and because of a lack of accountability and oversight. 
 
Secondly, since its creation, Frontex has tried to provide a framework for member states to 
cooperate with each other, diminishing the number of irregular migrants significantly. 
Nonetheless, prior as well as during the Arab Spring the operational cooperation proved to be 
inefficient and insufficient. As noted Frontex does not have any human right expertise or 
protection mandate. The added value of Frontex regarding human rights policy is thus limited 
(Koenig 2011:7). The operational solidarity proved to be inadequate during the Arab Spring. 
This is well illustrated by the actual deployment of equipment which was mainly delivered by 
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Italy. Furthermore, there are unclear and insufficient legal provisions to guide Frontex in its 
tasks to protect refugees. It was assumed that Frontex would be capable of rescuing refugees 
when capable or at least coordinating the rescue of the vessel in distress. Yet Frontex claimed 
non-responsibility as the vessel had never entered its operational area. Too little tools, both in 
legal provision and in equipment, have been given by the EU to Fontex in order to perform its 
tasks to protect refugees. This makes Frontex a weak instrument in terms of refugee 
protection, unable to live up to the expectations of member states to protect refugees. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Since 1951 refugees are protected under the Geneva Convention. The EU supplemented and 
specified the rights of refugees in its own legal order. However, a diminishing number of 
individuals in search of protection seemed to find refuge in Europe. Even more distressing 
was that 2011 was the deadliest year in terms of migrants dying on their journey to Europe. 
Scholars tell us that the corrosion of refugee protection has been caused by the securitization 
of migration. The aim of this securitization process was to prevent illegal migrants to enter 
European territory. Refugee protection was not supplemented with this increase of border 
security and as a consequence the refugee protection mechanism failed to fulfil its task. 
 
I have argued that the EU was near-sighted in the creation of border policy instruments, 
focusing on securing the border against illegal migration while leaving little attention for the 
protection of refugees. This led to an ineffective and insufficient refugee protection 
mechanism. I have shown this by testing the strengths and weaknesses of instruments aiming 
to protect refugees. By looking into instruments of European border policy aiming to protect 
refugees, this analysis has shown to what extent the objectives and regulations were able to 
protect refugees effectively. 
 
In this analysis, the Arab Spring played an important role as a means to illustrate the 
argument. I have used the influx of migrants as a result of the Arab Spring to highlight the 
weaknesses of the system. For reasons of simplification I have divided the instruments 
between internal and external border policy instruments. 
 
The instruments of internal border policy are the burden sharing principle and the reception 
standard. The analysis showed that the burden sharing principle – consisting of the solidarity 
principle and the principle of fair sharing of responsibility – are not effective because they are 
not implemented in effective tools to bring countries to pledge for asylum seekers. 
 
To start, the expectations of the burden sharing principle were different among northern states 
compared to southern states. These expectations could be different because implementation 
guidelines were lacking. Partly because of unfavourable economic and political conditions, 
the northern member states were not willing to implement the solidarity principle. Southern 
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states on the other hand were incapable to rely on their Northern counterparts when the 
situation became critical. This gap between willingness and expectations affected the trust 
between EU member states. This gap is caused by a lack of structures to enforce principles 
and by a lack of guidelines to implement these principles into national law. The gap makes the 
principle ineffective, significantly increases the pressure on EU border states and leads to the 
creation of external border policy instruments. The ineffectiveness of the burden sharing 
principle decreased the capability to protect refugees. 
 
Reception standards have been articulated in EU law to guarantee refugee protection upon 
arrival and during the stay of migrants in the EU. The expectations of a CEAP and especially 
the detailed reception directive should have provided refugee protection within the borders of 
the EU. The analysis showed that prior to the Arab Spring reports had articulated the mal-
implementation or non-implementation of the legal provisions by member states. In the 
following years hardly any improvements were made, probably because of the significant 
decrease in the arrival of migrants as a result of the third country partnerships. The Arab 
Spring highlighted this weakness and showed that especially EU border countries were 
unprepared for the influx of migrants. 
 
External border security instruments consist of third country partnerships and border security 
at sea. The objective of third country partnerships was to deter illegal migrants from arriving 
in Europe while protecting refugees. The analysis shows that the agreements do not comply 
with the non-refoulement principle. Preventing migrants from arriving on European territory 
or sending them back without granting them a full asylum procedure infringes this principle. 
Moreover, partnership agreements were made with states without safe conditions for 
migrants. Despite this knowledge partnership agreements with these kinds of states were 
growing in number. The greater this number, the more difficult it became to protect refugees. 
By impeding refugees to even start the procedure of asylum request, the partnership 
agreements are in breach of the Geneva Convention. 
 
The analysis concerning border policy at seas was conducted by looking into two tools of 
border policy: the supervision of SAR zones by coastal states and the tasks and tools of the 
border agency Frontex. Concerning the supervision of SAR zones, the analysis suggests that 
the legal basis, in principle, was not weak as there was a legal duty to render assistance to 
those in need of protection at sea. However, the objective of this border policy, as stated in 
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official documents, is to secure member states against illegal migrants. The regulations of the 
SAR Convention proved to be too weak to protect refugees. I concluded that this is the result 
of the fact that it was possible for countries to be signatories of different SAR conventions, 
and because of a lack of accountability and oversight. Concerning Frontex, too little tools, 
both in legal provisions and in equipment, had been given by the EU to the agency in order to 
perform its task to protect refugees. This makes Frontex a weak instrument in terms of 
refugee protection, unable to live up to the obligation of member states to protect refugees. 
Border policy at sea was thus not effective in protecting refugees as the initial aim and 
outcome was more to prevent migrants from arriving in Europe. 
 
When drawing the bigger picture it becomes clear that the various instruments cannot be 
studied separately because they are interlinked. If the principle of burden sharing would be 
effective and all the asylum seekers would be divided over 27 member states, it would relieve 
bordering states of the burden of responsibility for such a large amount of migrants. It would 
also diminish the weight on reception facilities and lower the chance that countries like Italy 
during the Arab Spring would perish under the burden and seek for alternative solutions like 
third country agreements. 
 
Moreover, a clear link between external border policies and reception standards is visible. In 
the two years prior to the Arab Spring both third country partnerships and border control by 
Frontex decreased the number of incoming migrants significantly. This resulted in the 
underpreparedness of EU countries when the governments of Arab countries - and 
simultaneously the partnerships - collapsed. Frontex had too little tools with which to 
coordinate surveillance of the sea and the differences in versions of the SAR Convention led 
to the inability to protect refugees when it was most needed. The strong instruments created to 
stop illegal migrants coming to the EU needed an upgrading of instruments to protect those in 
need of asylum. The existing instruments have proved to be too weak to protect refugees. 
 
The analysis shows that the balance between securitisation and refugee protection is uneven 
because the upgrading of refugee protection has been neglected. I call this the near-sighted 
attitude of European border security, focusing more on securing the border against illegal 
migration than on the protection of refugees, resulting in an inability to protect refugees on an 
international and European level. This was highlighted by the case of the Arab Spring. 
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The gap between capabilities and expectations has been widened by the critical political and 
economic situation in Europe. Eventually this could lead to the dismantling of the Schengen 
zone. On the 8th of June 2012, EU countries have given themselves more freedom to reinstall 
border controls (Nielsen 2012). It is questionable whether this process of dismantling 
Schengen zone can be reversed. Thus weak European border instruments do not only affect 
refugee protection it will also modify the free movement of people and goods, and 
fragmentise the unity that the EU proclaims. 
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